

## **Civil-Military Relations**

POSC 347, 3 credits

Fall 2022

MWF 9:20-10:10, Persson 133

### ***Contact Information***

Dr. Drew H. Kinney

Office: Persson 110

Office Hours: TBD

Email: [dkinney@colgate.edu](mailto:dkinney@colgate.edu)

Course site: [Moodle](#)

***Course Description.*** This course is a seminar on the major themes and debates in the study of civil-military relations (CMR). In modern states questions about the proper balance between the armed forces and the civilian political leadership is a key feature of politics. At the most extreme, the military itself takes power. In established democracies civil-military relations do not take this extreme form, but important debates remain about the proper degree of military influence over defense and foreign policy, and the degree to which military policy should be responsive to broader social and cultural values. As a subject of inquiry CMR cuts across many divisions in political science. Most issues we will discuss are traditionally placed in comparative politics or international relations, but also touch on themes from American politics, public policy/administration, and political theory (e.g., *The Republic*, *The Prince*).

Note that this is a course on *politics*, not military science or warfare. To the extent that we discuss actual wars, we will focus on relationships between soldiers and civilians in terms of decision-making. You will not be disadvantaged even if you have little background (or interest) in military history or strategy.

***Course Units.*** The course is organized into six separate units, covering the major issues in the study of civil-military relations. The first unit introduces the course by examining how the military relates to the larger society from which it is drawn, and the relationship between military values and societal values. In the second unit we concentrate on Samuel Huntington's arguments about military professionalism set out in *The Soldier and the State* (1957), a still highly influential book 50+ years after publication. In the third unit we look at the causes, consequences, and formation of military coups, as well as consider military repression and defection during moments of social unrest. In the fourth unit we consider the prospects for greater civilian control in countries moving from authoritarian to democratic government. The fifth unit examines civil-military relations during decisions to use military force and go to war.

The sixth and final unit focuses on 21st century challenges in civil-military relations, in the U.S. and elsewhere. The above-mentioned units are listed as follows:

1. The State, Society, and Its Soldiers.
2. Military Professionalism.
3. Who's In Charge?
4. Democratic Militaries.
5. The Use of Force.
6. New Challenges in Civil-Military Relations.

### ***Course Requirements and Evaluation***

#### **Break-down of course grades:**

Huntington/Janowitz Reaction Paper (due Sept. 12)	10%
Clausewitz/Iraq Essay (due Nov. 4)	10%
Participation	20%
Research Paper 1 (due Oct. 5)	10%
Midterm Exam (due Oct. 12)	20%
Research Paper 2 (due Nov. 16)	10%
Final Paper (due Dec. 13 @ 11 a.m.)	20%

***Huntington/Janowitz Reaction Paper.*** Two of the most influential CMR books are Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* and Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier*. Huntington, in particular, has largely defined the terms of writing on CMR. Thus, during the section in which we read Huntington and Janowitz, each student will write a short (3 pages, double-spaced) review essay that critically assesses the section's readings (Huntington, Janowitz, Finer, Feaver). Please consult the [rubric](#) for more information on how to complete this assignment.

The paper is due via Moodle on September 12th by 11:59p.m., at which time the automated assignment window will close. Your grade on this paper will constitute 10% of your final grade.

***The Clausewitz/Iraq Essay*** The second writing assignment is an analysis (3 pages, double-spaced) of U.S. civil-military relations in the Iraq War. You should use Clausewitz's arguments about the relationship between politics and war to critically evaluate U.S. civil-military relations during the war. Please consult the [rubric](#) for more information on how to complete this assignment.

The paper is due via Moodle on November 4th by 11:59p.m., at which time the automated assignment window will close. Your grade on this paper will constitute 10% of your final grade.

***Attendance.*** Attendance is a requirement if you wish to do well in this course. In-class notes, discussion, and lecture material are the basis for the course's exams.

I give you two allowed absences, no questions asked. You will be responsible for course material and discussion content for days that you miss. For absences beyond the given two allowed absences, you must provide some sort of documentation, excluding in certain circumstances as discussed with me. Missing more than three courses without good cause, e.g., illness, religious holidays, family deaths, will result in a 2% grade reduction per absence. It is possible to earn a failure due to absence (FA) in this course.

***Participation.*** Individual participation is worth 20% of your grade. Simply showing up for class is not sufficient to earn participation points. You are expected to attend classes regularly and participate in discussions. I want you to talk so that you engage with the material and your classmates. It is not any more complicated than that. You are free to ask about current events, readings you did not understand, et cetera. This way we can learn interactively.

***Midterm Exam.*** The midterm exam will cover the first three units. The exam will be an open-note, open-book take-home exam. This means that I expect answers to be of higher quality than in-class responses. Answers will be typed into an existing Word.docx, which I will provide. You will then submit your exam via Moodle by 11:59 p.m. on October 12th. Exams are to be completed alone, not through consultation with classmates.

***Research Papers.*** The major assignment for this course is a research paper on civil-military relations in one country. This paper will be written in stages and will focus on two of four possible key themes from the course. The four possible themes are:

1. The State, Society, and Its Soldiers;
2. Who's in charge?;
3. Democratic Militaries;
4. The use of force.

The readings on Security Sector Reform may be incorporated into the “Who’s in Charge?” section of the final paper, if appropriate.

**List of three countries.** On September 2nd, you must submit a list of three countries you would most like to write on (rank ordered). I will assign everyone a country based on that preference-list. I will do my best to avoid too much duplication. If you have a prior interest in a particular country or region, you are encouraged to explore that interest here. As a general rule, larger and more prominent countries have more extensive literatures than those on smaller countries. Finally, *no one can write on the United States* because we already have several weeks devoted mostly to the U.S.

**Paper 1.** Everyone will write a paper on theme 2 (*Who’s in Charge?*) for your first paper. In this paper, you can focus on military rule, coups, or civilian control, depending on your country. Paper 1 is due via Moodle by 11:59 p.m. on October 5th.

**Paper 2.** For your second paper, you should write on *either* theme 1 (*the State, Society, and its Soldiers*), theme 3 (*Democratic Militaries*) or theme 4 (*the Use of Force*), depending on which topic is more relevant to your country and your own interests. Paper 2 is due via Moodle by 11:59 p.m. on November 16th.

These two papers should each be 5 pages long.

**Final Paper.** At the end of the semester you will produce a 20-page paper that brings these two papers together into one coherent paper that provides an overview of civil-military relations in your chosen country. The final paper is due via Moodle by 11 a.m. on December 13th.

Feel free to discuss this paper assignment with me. If the current description is unclear, I trust the assignment will make more sense as the semester goes along. For a detailed breakdown of how these assignments should be structured and how they will be graded, please see the [rubric](#).

### ***Course Policies.***

**Makeup exams.** You are not automatically entitled to a makeup examination, which are only given in cases of compelling and well-documented excuses, e.g., acute illness, religious observances, athletic events. Oversleeping is not included on that list. You must also have documentation from a physician (not a nurse) or the appropriate administrator at the College. If you have sufficient cause to warrant a makeup exam, I will determine the date and time of the exam.

**Late submissions.** If you submit work late, I reserve the right to fail you (with a zero) on that particular assignment. If you find yourself needing more time to complete assignments, please proactively contact me via email and ask for an extension. Late submissions will be graded down 1/3 letter grade for each day that they are late. Computer problems (disk failure, unable to find a printer, et cetera), or other reasons/excuses of a similar nature, are not acceptable excuses for a late paper.

**Grading.** I encourage you to come see me if you have questions about a grade for an assignment. However, I do ask that you wait one week (a cooling off period). During that time, please re-read your assignment and be prepared to defend your position by incorporating relevant course materials.

**Computers & cell phones.** If you bring a laptop to class, it should be used only for taking notes or consulting assigned readings. It is both distracting and disrespectful to me and your colleagues if you are web-surfing, etc. when you are supposed to be participating in classroom discussion. I do notice, and it will affect your participation grade. Cell phones should be silent and put away, and texting should be kept to a minimum. I will disallow the use of electronics entirely if this policy is abused.

**Readings.** You are responsible for all reading assignments. Come prepared to discuss them, and please make sure to have them handy during class. All readings are available through the syllabus via links, which are marked in blue (below). Clicking on the Further Reading “doc” will bring you to a Google Doc of additional readings on each course topic. These links will remain active beyond the length of the course, so you can use them for independent research, capstones, and the like. Clicking “Notes” brings you to a Google Doc that raises general and specific questions related to the readings for each topic. Ideally, you will click this link before you read for class, as a reading guide. These will also serve as study guides because I update them after each lecture.

Note that the readings for each week are listed in the order in which I recommend you read them. This is not an indication of their importance, but there is a logic to how the readings fit together.

**Nota Bene.** It is essential that you complete the readings in the course. If it becomes apparent that the class is not keeping up with the readings, I reserve the right to administer surprise quizzes.

**Course Feedback** Aside from the formal evaluation at the end of the term, I welcome and encourage feedback throughout the semester on course structure, readings, lectures, et cetera. If you would like to see additional topics covered, please let me know and I will give it consideration. Comments, suggestions, and criticisms will have no bearing (positive or negative) on your grade. You may leave anonymous feedback via Google Forms by: 1) signing in to the course Moodle site and 2) clicking “Course Feedback.”

**Accessibility.** Any students with disabilities or other needs, who need special accommodations in this course, are invited to share these concerns or requests with the instructor and should contact Colgate's Office of Disability Services: <https://www.colgate.edu/about/offices-centers-institutes/centers-institutes/center-learning-teaching-and-research/office>.

**Code of Academic Conduct.** The Code of Student Conduct applies to all undergraduate students, full-time and part-time, at Colgate University. Colgate University expects and requires behavior compatible with its high standards of scholarship. By accepting admission to the university, a student accepts its regulations (i.e., [Code of Student Conduct](#)) and acknowledges the right of the university to take disciplinary action, including suspension or expulsion, for conduct judged unsatisfactory or disruptive.

**Title IX.** Colgate University recognizes the inherent dignity of all individuals and promotes respect for all people. As such, Colgate is committed to providing an environment free of all forms of Colgate including sexual and gender-based discrimination, harassment, and violence like sexual assault, intimate partner violence, and stalking. If you (or someone you know) has experienced or is experiencing these types of behaviors, know that you are not alone. Resources and support are available: you can learn more at <https://www.colgate.edu/about/offices-centers-institutes/provost-and-dean-faculty/equity-and-diversity/non-discrimination>. You can also make a report yourself, including an anonymous report, through the form at <https://www.colgate.edu/about/campus-services-and-resources/reporting-incident-or-concern>.

## Course Outline

### **August 25, Introduction**<sup>1</sup>

#### **I. The State, Society, and Its Soldiers.**

##### Further Reading, Notes

### **August 29, States, Militaries, and War**

Max Weber. 1946. "[Politics as a Vocation](#)." In Gerth and Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (excerpt, pp. 77-83).

Charles Tilly. 1985. "[War Making and State Making as Organized Crime](#)," in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (169-191).

### **August 31, War-Making and State-Making**

Miguel Angel Centeno. 1997. "[Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America](#)." *American Journal of Sociology* 102(6), 1565-1605.

Jeffrey Herbst. 1990. "[War and the State in Africa](#)." *International Security* 14(4), 117-39.

### **September 2, Nationalism and War**<sup>2</sup>

Barry Posen. 1993. "[Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power](#)." *International Security*, 1(2), 80-124.

Ronald Krebs. 2004. "[A School for the Nation? How Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How It Might](#)." *International Security*, 28(4), 85-124.

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<sup>1</sup> Review U.S. Army [unit organization](#). Click on the links for fuller descriptions of different unit types.

<sup>2</sup> List of three countries due in class.

## II. Military Professionalism.

### Further Reading, Notes

#### ***September 5, Huntington, Janowitz, and Professional Soldiers***

Samuel P. Huntington. 1957. *The Soldier and the State*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (vii-viii, 1-79).

#### ***September 7, Huntington, Janowitz, and Professional Soldiers***

Samuel P. Huntington. 1957. *The Soldier and the State*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (80-99, 163-169, 177-180, 184-192).

#### ***September 9, Huntington, Janowitz, and Professional Soldiers***

Samuel E. Finer. 1962. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. New York: Pall Mall Press (pp. 1-85).

#### ***September 12, Huntington, Janowitz, and Professional Soldiers***<sup>3</sup>

Morris Janowitz. 1960/1971. *The Professional Soldier*. Free Press (pp. 417-442).

Peter Feaver. 1996. "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." *Armed Forces & Society* 23(2), 149-178.

## III. Who's in Charge?

### Further Reading, Notes

#### ***September 14, Coup Theories I***

Eric Nordlinger. 1977. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Prentice-Hall

(pp. 63-78, 85-95).

Brian D. Taylor. 2003. *Politics and The Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 6-30).

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<sup>3</sup> Huntington/Janowitz Reaction Paper due via Moodle no later than 11:59 p.m.



### ***September 16, Coup Theories II***

Samuel P. Huntington. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press (pp. 1-5, 78-80, 192-263, 460-461).

### ***September 19, Coup Dynamics***

Drew Holland Kinney. 2019. “[Politicians at Arms: Civilian Recruitment of Soldiers for Middle East Coups.](#)” *Armed Forces & Society* 45(4), 681-701.

Drew Holland Kinney. 2021. “[Sharing Saddles: Oligarchs and Officers on Horseback in Egypt and Tunisia.](#)” *International Studies Quarterly*. Firstview.

### ***September 21, Coup Consequences & the “Good Coup”***

Erica De Bruin. 2019. “[Will There Be Blood? Explaining Violence During Coups d’état.](#)” *Journal of Peace Research* 56(6), 797-811.

Erica De Bruin. 2019. “[Why Does the United States Still Believe the Myth of the Good Coup?](#)” *The Washington Post*, November 13.

*Erica De Bruin is scheduled to visit the class on this day to discuss her new book.*

### ***September 23, Coup Legitimation***

Kira Jumet. 2017. “[The June 30th Coup](#) (ch. 7).” In *Contesting the Repressive State: Why Ordinary Egyptians Protested During the Arab Spring*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sharan Grewal and Yasser Kureshi. 2019. “[How to Sell a Coup: Elections as Coup Legitimation.](#)” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(4), 1001-31.

### ***September 25, Coup-Proofing***

James Quinlivan. 1999. “[Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East.](#)” *International Security* 24(2), 131-65.

Holger Albrecht. 2015. “[The Myth of Coup-proofing: Risk and Instances of Military Coups d’état in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950-2013.](#)” *Armed Forces & Society* 41(4), 659-87.

### **September 26, Military Responses to Protests**

Sean Burns. 2018. *Revolts and the Military in the Arab Spring: Popular Uprisings and the Politics of Repression*. New York: I.B. Tauris (ch. 1).

David Pion-Berlin, Diego Esparza, & Kevin Grisham. 2014. "Staying Quartered: Civilian Uprisings and Military Disobedience in the Twenty-First Century." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(2), 230-59.

### **September 28, Military Responses to the Arab Spring I**

Derek Lutterbeck. 2013. "Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces & Society* 39(1), 28-52.

Michael Makara. 2013. "Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring." *Democracy and Security* 9(4), 334-49.

### **September 30, Military Responses to the Arab Spring II**

Sean Burns. 2018. *Revolts and the Military in the Arab Spring: Popular Uprisings and the Politics of Repression*. New York: I.B. Tauris (ch. 5).

Sharan Grewal. 2019. "Military Defection During Localized Protests: The Case of Tataouine." *International Studies Quarterly* 63(2), 259-69.

### **October 3, Military Responses to the Arab Spring III**

Sean Burns. 2018. *Revolts and the Military in the Arab Spring: Popular Uprisings and the Politics of Repression*. New York: I.B. Tauris (ch. 8).

### **October 5, An American Coup? <sup>4</sup>**

*Seven Days in May*. 1964.

### **October 10, Fall Break**

### **October 12 <sup>5</sup>**

Midterm Due

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<sup>4</sup> Research Paper 1 due via Moodle by 11:59p.m.

<sup>5</sup> Midterm exams due via Moodle by 11:59 p.m. You will receive the exam via Moodle on October 5th.

**IV. Democratic Militaries.**  
Further Reading, Notes

***October 14, The Military & Democracy I***

Richard Kohn. 1997. "How Democracies Control the Military." *Journal of Democracy* 8(4), 140-153.

***October 17, The Military & Democracy I***

Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster. 2002. "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces & Society* 29(1), 31-56.

***October 19, Building Democratic Armies I***

Zoltan Barany. 2012. *The Soldier and the Changing State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press (pp. 14-43).

***October 21, Building Democratic Armies II***

Zoltan Barany. 2012. *The Soldier and the Changing State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press (pp. 143-211).

***October 24, Building Democratic Armies III***

Zoltan Barany. 2012. *The Soldier and the Changing State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press (pp. 245-357).

**V. The Use of Force.**  
Further Reading, Notes

***October 26, War-Fighting***

Carl Von Clausewitz. 1832/1976. *On War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press (pp. 75-89, 585-594, 605-610).

Eliot A. Cohen. 2003. *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. Anchor Books (preface, chs. 1-5).

***October 28, European War-Fighting***

Jack Snyder. 1984. "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984." *International Security* 9(1), 108-46.

Elizabeth Kier. 1995. "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars." *International Security* 19(4), 65-93.

***October 31, The United States in Vietnam***

H. R. McMaster. 1997. *Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam*. Harper Collins (pp. 323-34).

***November 2, The United States between Wars***

Eliot A. Cohen. 2003. *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*.

Anchor Books (ch. 6).

Kenneth Campbell. 1998. "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine." *Armed Forces & Society* 24(3), 357-374.

Colin L. Powell. 1992/1993. "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead." *Foreign Affairs*. Winter.

Michael A. Cohen. 2009. "The Powell Doctrine's Enduring Relevance." *World Politics Review*, July 22.

**November 4, *The United States after 9/11: George W. Bush & Barack Obama***<sup>6</sup>  
Michael Desch. 2007. “[Bush and the Generals.](#)” *Foreign Affairs* 86(3), 97-108.

Richard B. Myers, Richard H. Kohn, and Mackubin Thomas Owens. 2007. “[Salute and Disobey? The Civil-Military Balance, Before Iraq and After.](#)” *Foreign Affairs* 86(5), 147-56.

Thomas Sheppard and Bryan Groves. 2015. “[Post-9/11 Civil-Military Relations.](#)” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 9(3): 62-87.

**November 7, *Civil-Military Relations under Donald Trump***

Michael O’Hanlon. 2016. “[Civil-Military Relations and the 2016 Presidential Race.](#)” *Brookings Institute*, August 29.

Lindsey P. Cohn. 2018. “[The Precarious State of Civil-Military Relations in the Age of Trump.](#)” *War on the Rocks*, March 28.

**VI. New Challenges in Civil-Military Relations.**

[Further Reading, Notes](#)

**November 9, *The Civil-Military “Gap”***

Harry S. Truman. 1963. “[Limit CIA Role to Intelligence.](#)” *The Washington Post*, December 22.

Dwight Eisenhower. 1961. “[Farewell Address.](#)” *Public Broadcasting Service*, January 17.

James Burk. 2001. “[The Military's Presence in American Society, 1950-2000.](#)” in Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, eds., *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (pp. 247-274). Cambridge: MIT Press.

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<sup>6</sup> Clausewitz/Iraq Essay due via Moodle no later than 11:59 p.m.

***November 11, Who Serves? Challenges of an All-Volunteer Force***

Robert Goldrich. 2011. "American Military Culture from Colony to Empire." *Daedalus* 140(3), 58-74.

Karl Eikenberry. 2013. "Reassessing the All-Volunteer Force." *The Washington Quarterly* 36(1), 7-24.

***November 14 Civil-Military Challenges of 21st Century Operations***

T. E. Lawrence. 1917. "The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence." *The Arab Bulletin*. August 20.

Robert Egnell. 2006. "Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil-Military Dimension." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29(6), 1041-75.

***November 16, Counterinsurgency***<sup>7</sup>

Fred Kaplan. 2013. "The End of the Age of Petraeus: The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency." *Foreign Affairs*, 92(1), 75-90.

U.S. Army. 2007. *The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (pp. 53-77).

***November 18, Non-State Actors in 21st Century Operations***

Nancy Roberts. 2010. "Spanning 'Bleeding' Boundaries: Humanitarianism, NGOs, and the Civilian Military Nexus in the Post-Cold War Era." *Public Administration Review*, 70(2), 212-222.

Anna Leander. 2007. "Regulating the role of private military companies in shaping security and politics," in Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnhardt, eds., *From Mercenaries to Market*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (pp. 49-65).

***Thanksgiving Break, November 19-27***

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<sup>7</sup> Research Paper 2 due via Moodle by 11:59 p.m..

**November 28, State Building and Security Sector Reform**

Robert Egnell and Peter Halden. 2009. "Laudable, Ahistorical, and Overambitious: Security Sector Reform Meets State Formation Theory." *Conflict, Security & Development* 9(1), 27-54.

**November 30, State Building and Security Sector Reform: Solution or Illusion?**

Dipali Mukhopadhyay. 2009. "Disguised Warlordism & Combatanthood in Balkh: The Persistence of Informal Power in the Formal Afghan State." *Conflict, Security & Development* 9(4), 535-564.

**December 2, Security Sector Reform in Africa**

Sean McFate. 2008. "Lessons Learned from Liberia: Security Sector Reform in a Failed State." *RUSI Journal* 153(1), 62-66.

Sean Mcfate. 2010. "I Built an African Army." *Foreign Policy*, January 7.

**December 5, Norm Entrepreneurship: An Anti-Coup Norm?**

Issaka K. Souaré. 2014. "The African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur on Military Coups d'état in Africa (1952–2012)." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 52(1), 69-94.

**December 7, Course Summary**

**December 9, No class, work on papers**

**December 13**

Final Paper Due <sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Final paper due via Moodle by **11 a.m.**