

## **Civil-Military Relations**

POLI 3011-01, 3 credits

Spring 2020

MWF 2-2:50, F. Edward Hebert 210

### ***Contact Information***

Dr. Drew H. Kinney

Office: TBD

Office Hours: MW 9-11:00am, by [appointment](#)

Email: [dkinney@tulane.edu](mailto:dkinney@tulane.edu)

Course site: [Canvas](#)

***Course Description.*** This course is a seminar on the major themes and debates in the study of civil-military relations (CMR). In modern states questions about the proper balance between the armed forces and the civilian political leadership is a key feature of politics. At the most extreme, the military itself takes power. In established democracies civil-military relations do not take this extreme form, but important debates remain about the proper degree of military influence over defense and foreign policy, and the degree to which military policy should be responsive to broader social and cultural values. As a subject of inquiry CMR cuts across many divisions in political science. Most issues we will discuss are traditionally placed in comparative politics or international relations, but also touch on themes from American politics, public policy/administration, and political theory (e.g., *The Republic*, *The Prince*).

Note that this is a course on *politics*, not military science or warfare. To the extent that we discuss actual wars, we will focus on relationships between soldiers and civilians in terms of decision-making. You will not be disadvantaged even if you have little background (or interest) in military history or strategy.

***Course Units.*** The course is organized into six separate units, covering the major issues in the study of civil-military relations. The first unit introduces the course by examining how the military relates to the larger society from which it is drawn, and the relationship between military values and societal values. In the second unit we concentrate on Samuel Huntington's arguments about military professionalism set out in *The Soldier and the State* (1957), a still highly influential book 50+ years after publication. In the third unit we look at the causes, consequences, and formation of military coups, as well as consider military repression and defection during moments of social unrest. In the fourth unit we consider the prospects for greater civilian control in countries moving from authoritarian to democratic government. The fifth unit examines civil-military relations during decisions to use military force and go to war.

The sixth and final unit focuses on 21st century challenges in civil-military relations, in the U.S. and elsewhere. The above-mentioned units are listed as follows:

1. The State, Society, and Its Soldiers.
2. Military Professionalism.
3. Who's In Charge?
4. Democratic Militaries.
5. The Use of Force.
6. New Challenges in Civil-Military Relations.

**Required Texts.** This course has *two required texts*. The price below is based on the new book, but of course you can buy used (or an older edition, e-book, et cetera):

Samuel E. Finer. 1962. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. New York: Routledge. (ISBN: [0765809222](#))

Eliot A. Cohen. 2003. *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. Anchor Books. (ISBN: [0743230493](#))

### ***Course Requirements and Evaluation***

#### **Break-down of course grades:**

Huntington/Janowitz Reaction Paper (due Jan. 31)	10%
Clausewitz/Iraq Essay (due Mar. 25)	10%
Discussion Leadership	10%
Participation	20%
Midterm Exam (due Mar. 2)	25%
Final Exam (due Apr. 27)	25%

***Huntington/Janowitz Reaction Paper.*** Two of the most influential CMR books are Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* and Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier*. Huntington, in particular, has largely defined the terms of writing on CMR. Thus, during the section in which we read Huntington and Janowitz, each student will write a short (3 pages, double-spaced) review essay that critically assesses the section's readings (Huntington, Janowitz, Finer, Feaver). Please consult the [rubric](#) for more information on how to complete this assignment.

The paper is due via Canvas class on January 31st by 11:59p.m., at which time the automated assignment window will close. Your grade on this paper will constitute 10% of your final grade.

***The Clausewitz/Iraq Essay.*** The second writing assignment is an analysis (3 pages, double-spaced) of U.S. civil-military relations in the Iraq War. You should use Clausewitz's arguments about the relationship between politics and war to critically evaluate U.S. civil-military relations during the war. Please consult the [rubric](#) for more information on how to complete this assignment.

The paper is due via Canvas class on March 25th by 11:59p.m., at which time the automated assignment window will close. Your grade on this paper will constitute 10% of your final grade.

***Attendance.*** Attendance is a requirement if you wish to do well in this course. In-class notes, discussion, and lecture material are the basis for the course's exams.

I give you two allowed absences, no questions asked. You will be responsible for course material and discussion content for days that you miss. For absences beyond the given two allowed absences, you must provide some sort of documentation, excluding in certain circumstances as discussed with me. Missing more than three courses without good cause, e.g., illness, religious holidays, family deaths, will result in a 2% grade reduction per absence. It is possible to earn a failure due to absence (FA) in this course.

***Participation.*** Individual participation is worth 20% of your grade. Simply showing up for class is not sufficient to earn participation points. You are expected to attend classes regularly and participate in discussions. I want you to talk so that you engage with the material and your classmates. It is not any more complicated than that. You are free to ask about current events, readings you did not understand, et cetera. This way we can learn interactively.

***Discussion Leadership.*** Each week, one student will be chosen to lead the class with questions about readings and discussion points. I will move down the roster to choose each session's discussion leader, who I will notify prior to the next class session.

***Midterm Exam.*** The midterm exam will cover the first three units. The exam will be an open-note, open-book take-home exam. This means that I expect answers to be of higher quality than in-class responses. Answers will be typed into an existing Word.docx, which I will provide. You will then submit your exam via Canvas by 11:59 p.m. on March 2nd. Exams are to be completed alone, not through consultation with classmates.

***Final Exam.*** The final exam will cover the final three units. The exam will be an open-note, open-book take-home exam. This means that I expect answers to be of higher quality than in-class responses. Answers will be typed into an existing Word.docx, which I will provide. You

will then submit your exam via Canvas by 11:59 p.m. on April 27th. Exams are to be completed alone, not through consultation with classmates.

### ***Course Grading Policies.***

**Makeup exams.** You are not automatically entitled to a makeup examination, which are only given in cases of compelling and well-documented excuses, e.g., acute illness, religious observances, athletic events. Oversleeping is not included on that list. You must also have documentation from a physician (not a nurse) or the appropriate administrator at the College. If you have sufficient cause to warrant a makeup exam, I will determine the date and time of the exam.

**Late submissions.** If you submit work late, I reserve the right to fail you (with a zero) on that particular assignment. If you find yourself needing more time to complete assignments, please proactively contact me via email and ask for an extension. Late submissions will be graded down 1/3 letter grade for each day that they are late. Computer problems (disk failure, unable to find a printer, et cetera), or other reasons/excuses of a similar nature, are not acceptable excuses for a late paper.

**Grading.** I encourage you to come see me if you have questions about a grade for an assignment. However, I do ask that you wait one week (a cooling off period). During that time, please re-read your assignment and be prepared to defend your position by incorporating relevant course materials.

**Computers & cell phones.** If you bring a laptop to class, it should be used only for taking notes or consulting assigned readings. It is both distracting and disrespectful to me and your colleagues if you are web-surfing, etc. when you are supposed to be participating in classroom discussion. I do notice, and it will affect your participation grade. Cell phones should be silent and put away, and texting should be kept to a minimum. I will disallow the use of electronics entirely if this policy is abused.

**Readings.** You are responsible for all reading assignments. Come prepared to discuss them, and please make sure to have them handy during class. All readings are available through the syllabus via links, which are marked in blue (below). Clicking on the Further Reading “doc” will bring you to a Google Doc of additional readings on each course topic. These links will remain active beyond the length of the course, so you can use them for independent research, capstones, and the like. Clicking “Notes” brings you to a Google Doc that raises general and specific questions related to the readings for each topic. Ideally, you will click this link before you read for class, as a reading guide. These will also serve as study guides because I update them after each lecture.

Note that the readings for each week are listed in the order in which I recommend you read them. This is not an indication of their importance, but there is a logic to how the readings fit together.

**Nota Bene.** It is essential that you complete the readings in the course. If it becomes apparent that the class is not keeping up with the readings, I reserve the right to administer surprise quizzes. If this occurs, I will redistribute the relative weight of the course assignments.

**Course Feedback.** Aside from the formal evaluation at the end of the term, I welcome and encourage feedback throughout the semester on course structure, readings, lectures, et cetera. If you would like to see additional topics covered, please let me know and I will give it consideration. Comments, suggestions, and criticisms will have no bearing (positive or negative) on your grade. You may leave anonymous feedback via Google Forms by: 1) signing in to the course Canvas site; 2) clicking the “Modules” tab; 3) clicking “Course Feedback” tab.

**ADA/Accessibility Statement.** Any students with disabilities or other needs, who need special accommodations in this course, are invited to share these concerns or requests with the instructor and should contact Goldman Center for Student Accessibility: <http://accessibility.tulane.edu> or (504) 862-8433.

**Code of Academic Conduct.** The Code of Academic Conduct applies to all undergraduate students, full-time and part-time, in Tulane University. Tulane University expects and requires behavior compatible with its high standards of scholarship. By accepting admission to the university, a student accepts its regulations (i.e., [Code of Academic Conduct](#) and [Code of Student Conduct](#)) and acknowledges the right of the university to take disciplinary action, including suspension or expulsion, for conduct judged unsatisfactory or disruptive.

**Title IX.** Tulane University recognizes the inherent dignity of all individuals and promotes respect for all people. As such, Tulane is committed to providing an environment free of all forms of discrimination including sexual and gender-based discrimination, harassment, and violence like sexual assault, intimate partner violence, and stalking. If you (or someone you know) has experienced or is experiencing these types of behaviors, know that you are not alone. Resources and support are available: you can learn more at [allin.tulane.edu](http://allin.tulane.edu). Any and all of your communications on these matters will be treated as either “Confidential” or “Private” as explained in the chart below. Please know that if you choose to confide in me I am mandated by the university to report to the Title IX Coordinator, as Tulane and I want to be sure you are connected with all the support the university can offer. You do not need to respond to outreach from the university if you do not want. You can also make a report yourself, including an anonymous report, through the form at [tulane.edu/concerns](http://tulane.edu/concerns).

## Course Outline

### **January 13, Introduction**<sup>1</sup>

#### **I. The State, Society, and Its Soldiers.**

##### Further Reading, Notes

### **January 15, States, Militaries, and War**

Max Weber. 1946. "[Politics as a Vocation](#)." In Gerth and Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (excerpt, pp. 77-83).

Charles Tilly. 1985. "[War Making and State Making as Organized Crime](#)," in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (169-191).

### **January 17, War-Making and State-Making**

Miguel Angel Centeno. 1997. "[Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America](#)." *American Journal of Sociology* 102(6), 1565-1605.

Jeffrey Herbst. 1990. "[War and the State in Africa](#)." *International Security* 14(4), 117-39.

### **January 20**

Martin Luther King Day

### **January 22, Nationalism and War**

Barry Posen. 1993. "[Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power](#)." *International Security*, 18(2), 80-124.

Ronald Krebs. 2004. "[A School for the Nation? How Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How It Might](#)." *International Security*, 28(4), 85-124.

---

<sup>1</sup> Review U.S. Army [unit organization](#). Click on the links for fuller descriptions of different unit types.

## II. Military Professionalism.

### Further Reading, Notes

#### ***January 24, Huntington, Janowitz, and Professional Soldiers***

Samuel P. Huntington. 1957. *The Soldier and the State*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (vii-viii, 1-80).

#### ***January 27, Huntington, Janowitz, and Professional Soldiers***

Samuel P. Huntington. 1957. *The Soldier and the State*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (81-157, 163-169, 177-180, 184-192).

#### ***January 29, Huntington, Janowitz, and Professional Soldiers***

Samuel E. Finer. 1962. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. New York: Pall Mall Press (pp. 1-85).

#### ***January 31, Huntington, Janowitz, and Professional Soldiers*<sup>2</sup>**

Morris Janowitz. 1960/1971. *The Professional Soldier*. Free Press (pp. 417-442).

Peter Feaver. 1996. "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." *Armed Forces & Society* 23(2), 149-178.

## III. Who's in Charge?

### Further Reading, Notes

#### ***February 3, Coup Theories I***

Eric Nordlinger. 1977. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Prentice-Hall (pp. 63-78, 85-95).

Brian D. Taylor. 2003. *Politics and The Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 6-30).

---

<sup>2</sup> Huntington/Janowitz Reaction Paper due via Canvas no later than 11:59 p.m.

### ***February 5, Coup Theories II***

Samuel P. Huntington. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press (pp. 1-5, 78-80, 192-263, 460-461).

### ***February 7, Coup Dynamics***

Drew H. Kinney. 2019. “[Politicians at Arms: Civilian Recruitment of Soldiers for Middle East Coups.](#)” *Armed Forces & Society* 45(4), 681-701.

Naunihal Singh. 2014. *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (introduction).

### ***February 10, Coup Legitimation***

Kira Jomet. 2017. “[The June 30th Coup](#) (ch. 7).” In *Contesting the Repressive State: Why Ordinary Egyptians Protested During the Arab Spring*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sharan Grewal and Yasser Kureshi. 2019. “[How to Sell a Coup: Elections as Coup Legitimation.](#)” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(4), 1001-31.

### ***February 12, Coup Consequences & the “Good Coup”***

Erica De Bruin. 2019. “[Will There Be Blood? Explaining Violence During Coups d’état.](#)” *Journal of Peace Research* 56(6), 797-811.

Erica De Bruin. 2019. “[Why Does the United States Still Believe the Myth of the Good Coup?](#)” *The Washington Post*, November 13.

### ***February 14, Coup-Proofing***

James Quinlivan. 1999. “[Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East.](#)” *International Security* 24(2), 131-65.

Holger Albrecht. 2015. “[The Myth of Coup-proofing: Risk and Instances of Military Coups d’état in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950-2013.](#)” *Armed Forces & Society* 41(4), 659-87.

### **February 17, Military Responses to Protests**

Sean Burns. 2018. *Revolts and the Military in the Arab Spring: Popular Uprisings and the Politics of Repression*. New York: I.B. Tauris (ch. 1).

David Pion-Berlin, Diego Esparza, & Kevin Grisham. 2014. "Staying Quartered: Civilian Uprisings and Military Disobedience in the Twenty-First Century." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(2), 230-59.

### **February 19, Military Responses to the Arab Spring I**

Derek Lutterbeck. 2013. "Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces & Society* 39(1), 28-52.

Michael Makara. 2013. "Coups-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring." *Democracy and Security* 9(4), 334-49.

### **February 21, Military Responses to the Arab Spring II**

Sean Burns. 2018. *Revolts and the Military in the Arab Spring: Popular Uprisings and the Politics of Repression*. New York: I.B. Tauris (ch. 5).

Sharan Grewal. 2019. "Military Defection During Localized Protests: The Case of Tataouine." *International Studies Quarterly* 63(2), 259-69.

### **February 24**

Mardi Gras Break

### **February 26, Military Responses to the Arab Spring III**

Sean Burns. 2018. *Revolts and the Military in the Arab Spring: Popular Uprisings and the Politics of Repression*. New York: I.B. Tauris (chs. 6 & 8).

### **February 28, An American Coup?**

*Seven Days in May*. 1964.

### **March 2<sup>3</sup>**

Midterm

---

<sup>3</sup> Midterm exams due via Canvas by 11:59 p.m.

#### IV. Democratic Militaries.

##### Further Reading, Notes

###### ***March 4, The Military & Democracy I***

Richard Kohn. 1997. “[How Democracies Control the Military.](#)” *Journal of Democracy* 8(4), 140-153.

###### ***March 6, The Military & Democracy I***

Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster. 2002. “[The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations.](#)” *Armed Forces & Society* 29(1), 31-56.

###### ***March 9, Building Democratic Armies I***

Zoltan Barany. 2012. *The Soldier and the Changing State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press (pp. 1-110).

###### ***March 11, Building Democratic Armies II***

Zoltan Barany. 2012. *The Soldier and the Changing State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press (pp. 113-242).

###### ***March 13, Building Democratic Armies III***

Zoltan Barany. 2012. *The Soldier and the Changing State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press (pp. 245-357).

## V. The Use of Force.

### Further Reading, Notes

#### ***March 16, War-Fighting***

Carl Von Clausewitz. 1832/1976. *On War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press (pp. 75-89, 585-594, 605-610).

Eliot A. Cohen. 2003. *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. Anchor Books (preface, chs. 1-5).

#### ***March 18, European War-Fighting***

Jack Snyder. 1984. "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984." *International Security* 9(1), 108-46.

Elizabeth Kier. 1995. "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars." *International Security* 19(4), 65-93.

#### ***March 20, The United States in Vietnam***

H. R. McMaster. 1997. *Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam*. Harper Collins (pp. 323-34).

#### ***March 23, The United States between Wars***

Eliot A. Cohen. 2003. *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. Anchor Books (ch. 6).

Kenneth Campbell. 1998. "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine." *Armed Forces & Society* 24(3), 357-374.

Colin L. Powell. 1992/1993. "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead." *Foreign Affairs*. Winter.

Michael A. Cohen. 2009. "The Powell Doctrine's Enduring Relevance." *World Politics Review*, July 22.

***March 25, The United States after 9/11: George W. Bush & Barack Obama*** <sup>4</sup>

Michael Desch. 2007. “[Bush and the Generals.](#)” *Foreign Affairs* 86(3), 97-108.

Richard B. Myers, Richard H. Kohn, and Mackubin Thomas Owens. 2007. “[Salute and Disobey? The Civil-Military Balance, Before Iraq and After.](#)” *Foreign Affairs* 86(5), 147-56.

Thomas Sheppard and Bryan Groves. 2015. “[Post-9/11 Civil-Military Relations.](#)” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 9(3): 62-87.

***March 27, No Class***

ISA Conference

***March 30, Civil-Military Relations under Donald Trump***

Michael O’Hanlon. 2016. “[Civil-Military Relations and the 2016 Presidential Race.](#)” *Brookings Institute*, August 29.

Lindsey P. Cohn. 2018. “[The Precarious State of Civil-Military Relations in the Age of Trump.](#)” *War on the Rocks*, March 28.

**VI. New Challenges in Civil-Military Relations.**

**Further Reading, Notes**

***April 1, The Civil-Military “Gap”***

Harry S. Truman. 1963. “[Limit CIA Role to Intelligence.](#)” *The Washington Post*, December 22.

Dwight Eisenhower. 1961. “[Farewell Address.](#)” *Public Broadcasting Service*, January 17.

James Burk. 2001. “[The Military's Presence in American Society, 1950-2000.](#)” in Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, eds., *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (pp. 247-274). Cambridge: MIT Press.

---

<sup>4</sup> Clausewitz/Iraq Essay due via Canvas no later than 11:59 p.m.

***April 3, Who Serves? Challenges of an All-Volunteer Force***

Robert Goldrich. 2011. "American Military Culture from Colony to Empire." *Daedalus* 140(3), 58-74.

Karl Eikenberry. 2013. "Reassessing the All-Volunteer Force." *The Washington Quarterly* 36(1), 7-24.

***April 6-13***

Spring Break

***April 15, Civil-Military Challenges of 21st Century Operations***

T. E. Lawrence. 1917. "The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence." *The Arab Bulletin*. August 20.

Robert Egnell. 2006. "Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil-Military Dimension." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29(6), 1041-75.

***April 17, Counterinsurgency***

Fred Kaplan. 2013. "The End of the Age of Petraeus: The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency." *Foreign Affairs*, 92(1), 75-90.

U.S. Army. 2007. *The US. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (pp. 53-77).

***April 20, Non-State Actors in 21st Century Operations***

Nancy Roberts. 2010. "Spanning 'Bleeding' Boundaries: Humanitarianism, NGOs, and the Civilian Military Nexus in the Post-Cold War Era." *Public Administration Review*, 70(2), 212-222.

Anna Leander. 2007. "Regulating the role of private military companies in shaping security and politics," in Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt, eds., *From Mercenaries to Market*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (pp. 49-65).

***April 22, State Building and Security Sector Reform: Solution or Illusion?***

Robert Egnell and Peter Halden. 2009. "Laudable, Ahistorical, and Overambitious: Security Sector Reform Meets State Formation Theory." *Conflict, Security & Development* 9(1), 27-54.

Dipali Mukhopadhyay. 2009. "Disguised Warlordism & Combatanhood in Balkh: The Persistence of Informal Power in the Formal Afghan State." *Conflict, Security & Development* 9(4), 535-564.

***April 24, Security Sector Reform in Africa***

Sean McFate. 2008. "Lessons Learned from Liberia: Security Sector Reform in a Failed State." *RUSI Journal* 153(1), 62-66.

Sean Mcfate. 2010. "I Built an African Army." *Foreign Policy*, January 7.

***April 27, Norm Entrepreneurship & the African Security Sector***<sup>5</sup>

Issaka K. Souaré. 2014. "The African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur on Military Coups d'état in Africa (1952–2012)." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 52(1), 69-94.

Paul D. Williams. 2007. "From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture." *African Affairs* 106(423), 253-79.

---

<sup>5</sup> Final exam due via Canvas by 11:59 p.m.